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Several personality dispositions with common features capturing sensitivities to negative
social cues have recently been introduced into psychological research. To date,
however, little is known about their interrelations, their conjoint effects on behavior, or
their interplay with other risk factors. We asked N = 349 adults from Germany to rate
their justice, rejection, moral disgust, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attribution bias,
trait anger, and forms and functions of aggression. The sensitivity measures were mostly
positively correlated; particularly those with an egoistic focus, such as victim justice,
rejection, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attributions and trait anger as well as those
with an altruistic focus, such as observer justice, perpetrator justice, and moral disgust
sensitivity. The sensitivity measures had independent and differential effects on forms
and functions of aggression when considered simultaneously and when controlling
for hostile attributions and anger. They could not be integrated into a single factor of
interpersonal sensitivity or reduced to other well-known risk factors for aggression.
The sensitivity measures, therefore, require consideration in predicting and preventing
aggression.
Keywords: justice sensitivity, rejection sensitivity, provocation sensitivity, moral disgust sensitivity, trait anger,
hostile attribution bias, aggression
INTRODUCTION
Recently, several individual difference measures have been introduced into psychological research
that capture sensitivities to negative social cues, such as injustice, rejection, moral norm violations,
or provocation, and shape perceptions of and emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses
toward these cues. Little, however, is known about how these measures interrelate, whether they
can be considered discrete constructs, whether they can be distinguished from established similar
trait measures, and how they work together in predicting behavior.
Justice sensitivity predisposes to frequent perceptions of and intense emotional and
cognitive responses toward injustice from different perspectives, namely those of a victim,
an observer, or a perpetrator (Schmitt et al., 1995). Rejection sensitivity predisposes to
expecting, perceiving, and overreacting to potential rejection (Downey and Feldman, 1996).
Provocation sensitivity predisposes to perceiving others’ behavior as provoking (Lawrence, 2006).
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Moral disgust sensitivity predisposes to feelings of disgust in
the face of moral norm violations (Tybur et al., 2009; Table 1).
Hence, all sensitivities constitute social-cognitive trait measures
that may influence and explain interpersonal differences in
response to situational factors (Mischel and Shoda, 1995). Despite
potential similarities, coming from different fields of psychology,
these measures have rarely been considered simultaneously.
Thus, little or nothing is known about their interrelations
and similarities and whether they can be considered discrete
constructs. The first goal of the present study, therefore, was
to investigate whether justice, rejection, moral disgust, and
provocation sensitivity may be integrated into one single factor of
interpersonal sensitivity (e.g., unjust treatment, social rejection,
and moral norm violations could all be interpreted as forms
of provocation) or should be considered discrete constructs, in
order to add to a better understanding of these measures.
The sensitivity measures are not only theoretically similar,
but also have similar effects on behavior. For example, all have
been linked to aggression: Higher victim justice, rejection, and
provocation sensitivity predicted higher aggression (Downey
et al., 1998; Lawrence, 2006; Ayduk et al., 2008; Bondü and
Krahé, 2015); higher observer and perpetrator justice and moral
disgust sensitivity predicted lower aggression (Pond et al., 2011;
Bondü and Krahé, 2015). Aggression, therefore, is a valuable
outcome measure in order to examine similarities between the
sensitivity measures as well as their interplay in and their
independent contributions to predicting behavior. Furthermore,
it is important to identify variables that may promote aggression
in order to develop effective prevention measures. The second
aim of our study, therefore, was to investigate the conjoint
contribution of the sensitivity measures to the prediction of
aggression in order to examine the interplay of the sensitivity
measures in predicting behavior and to identify the most
influential potential risk factors for aggression among these
measures.
Finally, the sensitivity measures evoke emotional and
cognitive responses to the relevant cues that resemble other
important and well-established emotional and cognitive trait
risk factors for aggression, that is, trait anger and the hostile
attribution bias. Victim, rejection, moral disgust, and provocation
sensitivity are related to anger; observer sensitivity is linked to
indignation, a moral emotion similar to anger (Schmitt et al.,
1995; Lawrence, 2006). Trait anger reliably predicts aggression,
particularly reactive aggression that is shown in response to
perceived provocation (Crane and Testa, 2014). Furthermore,
victim and rejection sensitivity have been compared to the hostile
attribution bias (Gollwitzer et al., 2013; Bondü and Esser, 2015).
The hostile attribution bias is defined as the tendency to ascribe
negative, hostile intent to others’ ambiguous behavior (Epps and
Kendall, 1995). Similarly, people high in disgust sensitivity are
prone to ascribing evil intent to others (Jones and Fitness, 2008).
Thus, some sensitivity measures show overlaps with trait anger
and hostile attributions. Hence, the third aim of our study was to
investigate whether the sensitivity measures add to the prediction
of aggression above and beyond the hostile attribution bias and
trait anger as well-established affective and cognitive risk factors
for aggression or whether their effects can be explained by these
factors. If this were not the case, at least some of the sensitivity
measures would require stronger consideration as risk factors for
aggression by future research and when developing prevention
and intervention measures against aggression.
Thus, the present study seeks to add to a better understanding
of the sensitivity measures, their links to other risk factors for,
and their effects on aggression. It connects research questions
from personality and social psychology and adds to the ongoing
conversation about the meaning of contextual or social-cognitive
personality variables (sensitivity measures) as compared to more
global personality variables (e.g., trait anger).
Aggressive Behavior
According to a frequently used definition, aggression
encompasses behavior that aims at harming another person
who strives to avoid this harm (Baron and Richardson, 1994).
Aggression is not a homogeneous construct. Mostly, physical
(e.g., hitting), verbal (e.g., insulting), and relational (e.g.,
gossiping) forms of aggression are distinguished. Physical and
verbal aggression is more frequent in males. Some studies found
relational aggression to be more frequent among females than
among males, but mostly gender differences seemed negligible
(Archer, 2004; Card et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2009).
Furthermore, reactive and proactive functions of aggression
are distinguished. Reactive aggression is defined as aggression
in response to perceived negative treatment in order to defend
or retaliate and also referred to as hostile aggression. Reactive
aggression is related to anxiety, depression, or peer rejection.
Proactive aggression is defined as unprovoked aggression that is
utilized to attain egoistic goals (e.g., status, fun) and also referred
to as instrumental aggression. Proactive aggression is associated
with negative, but also with positive outcomes, such as higher
peer status (Vitaro et al., 2006).
Sensitivity Measures
The sensitivity measures in the present study (Table 1) share
several features. First, all capture vulnerabilities to negative social
TABLE 1 | Definitions of and overview over the sensitivity measures in the present study.
Justice Sensitivity The tendency to perceive and intensely respond to injustice. . .
. . . to one’s own disadvantage→ victim sensitivity
. . . to the disadvantage of others, caused by others→ observer sensitivity
. . . to the disadvantage of others, caused by oneself→ perpetrator sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 1995, 2010)
Rejection Sensitivity The tendency to expect, readily perceive, and overreact to rejection (Downey and Feldman, 1996, p. 1327).
Provocation Sensitivity The tendency to perceive others’ behavior as provoking (Lawrence, 2006)
Moral Disgust (Sensitivity) The tendency to experience disgust at moral norm violations (e.g., Tybur et al., 2009)
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cues, reflect interpersonal differences in response to situational
stimuli (Lawrence, 2006), and form social-cognitive personality
traits that guide individuals’ behavior in certain situations (e.g.,
Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 2015).
Second, justice, rejection, and moral disgust sensitivity showed
low to moderate correlations with neuroticism (Downey and
Feldman, 1996; Schmitt et al., 2005; Chapman and Anderson,
2013), indicating overlaps with this broad personality dimension,
but also large amounts of variance that cannot be explained
by neuroticism. Third, all sensitivities should predispose to
hypervigilance toward the respective relevant cues, expectations
of their occurrence, their frequent and intense perceptions, and
negative interpretations of ambiguous situations (e.g., Baumert
et al., 2010). Fourth, all measures require a negative appraisal
of others’ or one’s own behavior. Finally, all sensitivity measures
shape the cognitive, emotional, and/or behavioral responses
toward the respective cues.
Justice Sensitivity
Justice sensitivity predisposes to perceiving injustice from several
perspectives. Justice-sensitive individuals are generally prone
to rumination as the cognitive response toward injustice.
Highly victim-sensitive individuals readily perceive themselves
as victims of injustice and are prone to respond with anger
and retaliation; highly observer-sensitive individuals easily
perceive injustice to the disadvantage of others and are
prone to indignation, victim compensation, and perpetrator
punishment; highly perpetrator-sensitive individuals readily
perceive themselves as causing injustice and are prone to guilt,
victim compensation, and self-punishment (Schmitt et al., 2005,
2010).
Reflecting a conjoint concern for justice, all justice-sensitivity
perspectives are positively correlated. Victim sensitivity, however,
also comprises egoistic concerns for justice and correlates with
jealousy (Schmitt et al., 2005), hostility (Schmitt et al., 2010), and
antisocial behavior (Fetchenhauer and Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer
et al., 2005; Bondü and Krahé, 2015). Victim-sensitive individuals
are thought to have a suspicious mindset, to attribute hostile
intent, and to readily perceive cues of untrustworthiness, causing
them to withdraw cooperation in order to avoid being taken
advantage of in the alleged presence of these cues (Gollwitzer
et al., 2013). Thus, similar to the hostile attribution bias, victim
sensitivity may create expectations of others’ negative behavior
similar to dysfunctional thoughts (Bondü and Esser, 2015). In
children and adolescents, there were no gender differences in
victim sensitivity or its relations with aggression (Bondü and
Krahé, 2015). In adults, men reported higher victim sensitivity
(Schmitt et al., 2010), but links with aggression were more
pronounced in women (Bondü and Richter, 2015).
Observer and perpetrator justice sensitivity reflect altruistic
concerns for justice and positively correlate with empathy
(Schmitt et al., 2005) as well as prosocial behavior (Fetchenhauer
and Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer et al., 2005) and negatively correlate
with antisocial behavior (Gollwitzer et al., 2005, 2013; Bondü
and Esser, 2015; Bondü and Krahé, 2015). Evidence for prosocial
effects of perpetrator sensitivity is unequivocal, but observer
sensitivity may apparently promote reactive aggression (Lotz
et al., 2011; Bondü and Krahé, 2015). Females reported higher
observer and perpetrator sensitivity than males (Schmitt et al.,
2010; Bondü and Elsner, 2015), but there were no gender
differences in the links with aggression among boys and girls
(Bondü and Krahé, 2015).
Rejection Sensitivity
In adults, rejection sensitivity is defined as the concern and
expectation of not being accepted (Downey and Feldman, 1996).
It is related to a range of mental health problems, including
depressive, anxiety, or borderline symptoms (Rosenbach and
Renneberg, 2011). Regarding aggression, rejection-sensitive
adults are prone to jealousy, hostility, and aggression in partner
relationships (Downey et al., 2000; Romero-Canyas et al., 2010).
Furthermore, rejection sensitivity moderated the link between
rejection in a computer game and aggression (Ayduk et al., 2008).
Rejection sensitivity has been assumed to work similarly to the
hostile attribution bias as well (Bondü and Krahé, 2015). Links
between rejection sensitivity and aggression were similar for boys
and girls (Bondü and Krahé, 2015).
Provocation Sensitivity
So far, little is known about the affective and cognitive processes
underlying provocation sensitivity. In line with theoretical
assumptions, however, highly provocation-sensitive adults
tended to perceive others’ behavior as provoking (Lawrence and
Hodgkins, 2009). Provocation sensitivity was associated with
physical aggression (Lawrence, 2006) and predicted aggression
after provocation (Lawrence and Hutchinson, 2012), thus
backing the assumption that provocation is an important cause
of aggression (Anderson and Bushman, 2001). Those high and
low in provocation sensitivity did not differ in hostility and
trait anger (Lawrence, 2006). There were no gender differences
in provocation sensitivity, but particularly women reported
provocation to elicit aggression (Lawrence, 2006).
Moral Disgust Sensitivity
Not only physically aversive stimuli (e.g., feces) may evoke
disgust, but also moral norm transgressions (Chapman and
Anderson, 2013). Individuals differ in their tendency to feel
disgust at moral norm violations (Tybur et al., 2009). General
(primarily physical) disgust sensitivity and disease avoidance is
related to conservative values, authoritarianism, the advocation
of social exclusion of norm violators, and the attribution of evil
intent (Faulkner et al., 2004; Jones and Fitness, 2008). These
finding suggest positive correlations between disgust sensitivity
and aggression and, therefore, some have argued that disgust
sensitivity may be driven by anger rather than reflecting disgust
in the narrow sense (Simpson et al., 2006). However, if disgust
genuinely served as a moral emotion in moral disgust sensitivity
and because disgust is a withdrawal-orientated emotion, (moral)
disgust as opposed to anger should inhibit aggression. In line
with this reasoning, Pond et al. (2011) found moral disgust to
predict less physical, verbal, and reactive aggression and less
approval of intimate partner violence as well as to not relate
to hostility in experimental studies. Women show higher moral
disgust than men (Tybur et al., 2009). The moderating role of
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gender in the link of disgust sensitivity and aggression is not yet
well understood.
Similarities and Links between the Sensitivity
Measures
Given the similarities, we expected all sensitivity measures to
positively correlate. These correlations should be particularly
pronounced between measures with an egoistic focus, that is,
victim, rejection, and provocation sensitivity, and measures with
a moral/altruistic focus, that is, observer, perpetrator, and moral
disgust sensitivity. According to previous research, justice and
rejection sensitivity cannot be integrated into a single factor of
interpersonal sensitivity (Bondü and Esser, 2015; Bondü and
Richter, 2015). Thus, we also expected the other sensitivities to
form discrete measures that independently add to the prediction
of aggression. Victim, rejection, and provocation sensitivity
should predict higher aggression, particularly reactive aggression,
which is triggered by alleged negative social interactions.
Observer, perpetrator, and moral disgust sensitivity should
predict less aggression, particularly proactive aggression, because
moral concerns associated with these sensitivities should prevent
from using aggression to reach egoistic goals.
Other Risk Factors for Aggression
Hostile Attribution Bias
The tendency to attribute hostile intent in order to explain others’
ambiguous behavior (Epps and Kendall, 1995) has been linked
to aggression—particularly reactive aggression—in different age
groups (Dodge and Crick, 1990; Epps and Kendall, 1995; Bailey
and Ostrov, 2007). It has been outlined as one key risk factor for
aggressive behavior in the social information processing model
(Crick and Dodge, 1996) and by subsequent research (Orobio
de Castro et al., 2002), indicating that people with a strong
hostile attribution bias in particular tend to respond aggressively
to perceived provocation. There were no gender differences in
hostile attributions in children (Cillessen et al., 2014) or emerging
adults (Bailey and Ostrov, 2007), but boys revealed stronger links
between hostile attributions and aggression than girls (Cillessen
et al., 2014).
Trait Anger
Anger as an approach-oriented emotion that prepares for and
enables a fight response has been linked to aggressive behavior,
particularly to reactive aggression, in different age groups
(Hubbard et al., 2010; Crane and Testa, 2014). Trait anger
predisposes to frequent and intense anger in various situations
(Buss and Perry, 1992) and, consequently, to reactive aggression
in particular. In a representative German sample, there were no
gender differences in trait anger (Rohrmann et al., 2013).
Potential Links to Sensitivity Measures
We expected the egoistic-focused sensitivity measures to
positively relate to hostile attributions and anger. Reflecting
moral/altruistic concerns, we expected observer and perpetrator
sensitivity to negatively relate to hostile attributions and trait
anger. Because disgust has been linked to the attribution of
evil intentions (Jones and Fitness, 2008), we expected positive
links with hostile attributions. However, we assumed that
the emotion underlying moral disgust sensitivity is disgust
and, therefore, expected small—if any—correlations with trait
anger.
The Present Study
The present study examined the links of justice, rejection, moral
disgust, and provocation sensitivity, their associations with the
hostile attribution bias and trait anger, and their interplay
in predicting forms and functions of aggression in an adult
sample using structural equation models. Our study adds to the
understanding of individual difference variables pertaining to
sensitivities to social cues and their relations to negative social
behavior as well as potentially related broader trait measures.
Based on theoretical considerations and previous research results,
we derived the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Victim, observer, perpetrator, rejection,
provocation, and moral disgust sensitivity form positively
related, but discrete measures rather than combining into a
single factor of interpersonal sensitivity.
Hypothesis 2: (a) The sensitivity measures can be separated
from the hostile attribution bias and trait anger. (b) Victim,
rejection, and provocation sensitivity are positively related
to the hostile attribution bias and trait anger. (c) Observer
and perpetrator sensitivity are negatively related to the hostile
attribution bias and trait anger. (d) Moral disgust sensitivity is
positively related to hostile attributions only.
Hypothesis 3: Victim, rejection, and provocation sensitivity
positively predict aggression; perpetrator and moral disgust
sensitivity negatively predict aggression.
Hypothesis 4: These effects hold stable when the hostile
attribution bias and trait anger are entered into the model.
We also examined potential gender differences in prediction
patterns.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample
The sample included N = 349 German adults (70.8% female).
Participants were recruited via E-mail, social networks, and
notices in university buildings. Age ranged between 18 and
75 years (M = 27.2, SD = 10.37); 242 participants (69.3%)
were students (78.5% female), 17 (4.9%) visited school or were
in vocational training, 62 (20.6%) worked as salaried personnel
or freelancers, 6 (1.7%) were unemployed, and 12 (3.4%) had
another occupational status. Given the high percentage of
students and participants in vocational training, the average
income per month was low: 18.7% participants had no own
income, 55.2% an income below 1000 euro, 20.2% an income
between 1000 and 1999 euro, and 5.7% an income of 2000 euro
and above.
Measures
Table 2 shows the internal consistencies of all dependent and
independent measures in the present study.
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics and gender differences.
Scale α Total
M (SD)
Male
M (SD)
Female
M (SD)
Justice sensitivity–Victim
Justice sensitivity–Observer∗
Justice sensitivity–Perpetrator∗
Rejection sensitivity
Moral Disgust
Provocation Sensitivity
Hostile attributions∗
Anger
Physical aggression∗∗∗
Verbal aggression∗∗
Relational aggression
Proactive aggression
Reactive aggression
0.78
0.81
0.82
0.68
0.81
0.86
0.70
0.83
0.78
0.68
0.79
0.87
0.91
3.31 (0.97)
3.38 (0.87)
3.69 (0.95)
8.21 (3.42)
5.32 (0.68)
3.16 (0.67)
1.62 (0.33)
2.42 (0.57)
1.85 (0.63)
2.61 (0.54)
1.57 (0.67)
1.60 (0.60)
2.76 (0.87)
3.15 (0.95)
3.20 (0.95)
3.50 (1.01)
7.96 (3.41)
5.39 (0.74)
3.12 (0.66)
1.59 (0.32)
2.43 (0.57)
2.23 (0.70)
2.73 (0.61)
1.61 (0.72)
1.63 (0.66)
2.66 (0.85)
3.40 (0.96)
3.43 (0.83)
3.76 (0.92)
8.35 (3.45)
5.30 (0.66)
3.18 (0.68)
1.64 (0.33)
2.41 (0.57)
1.71 (0.53)
2.57 (0.51)
1.57 (0.66)
1.59 (0.57)
2.80 (0.87)
Significant gender differences: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; N = 339 (n
men = 100, n women = 239).
Justice Sensitivity
We measured victim (“I cannot easily bear it when others take
advantage of me”), observer (“I cannot easily bear it when
someone takes advantage of others”), and perpetrator justice
sensitivity (“I cannot easily bear the feeling of taking advantage
of someone”; 0 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree, respectively)
with the 5-items-per-scale version of the Justice Sensitivity
Inventory (Bondü and Elsner, 2015). We computed mean values
for each perspective. Evidence for the reliability and validity of
the original and the 5-item measure has been provided (Schmitt
et al., 2005, 2010; Bondü and Elsner, 2015).
Rejection Sensitivity
We measured rejection sensitivity with a translated version of
the Adult Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (Berenson et al.,
2009). Participants were presented with nine situations possibly
resulting in rejection (“You ask your parents for extra money to
cover living expenses”) and rated how anxious they would feel
about rejection (1 very unconcerned to 6 very anxious) as well
as the likelihood of rejection (1 very unlikely to 6 very likely).
Mean rejection sensitivity was computed by multiplying the
anxiety ratings with the reversed likelihood-of-rejection ratings
per situation and dividing their sum by nine (Berenson et al.,
2009). Evidence for the reliability and validity of the original
questionnaire has been provided (Berenson et al., 2009).
Provocation Sensitivity
We measured provocation sensitivity with 12 translated items
(“I feel aggressive when someone insults me”) from the
Situational Triggers of Aggressive Responses scale (Lawrence,
2006). Response options ranged from (1) totally disagree to (5)
totally agree. We computed mean values. The original measure
has been shown to be reliable and valid (Lawrence, 2006).
Moral Disgust Sensitivity
We measured moral disgust sensitivity using four translated
items from the Three Domains of Disgust Scale (“Forging
someone’s signature on a legal document”; Tybur et al., 2009)
and 12 translated items from Hutcherson and Gross (2011; “A
company executive refuses to sit next to a laborer on a train”).
Response options ranged from (1) not at all disgusting to (7)
extremely disgusting. We computed mean values. Both original
measures have been reported to be reliable and valid (Tybur et al.,
2009; Hutcherson and Gross, 2011).
Hostile Attribution Bias
We measured attributions of hostile intent with four translated
scenarios from the Social Information Processing–Attribution
Bias Questionnaire (Coccaro et al., 2009). Each scenario
described a situation with a negative outcome that may have been
caused intentionally or unintentionally. Participants rated the
likelihood of two explanations for the outcome signaling hostile
intent (“My co-worker wanted to burn me with hot coffee”) per
scenario from (1) very unlikely to (4) very likely. We computed
mean hostile attribution bias scores across the eight items. The
original measure has been shown to reliably and validly measure
the hostile attribution bias (Coccaro et al., 2009).
Trait Anger
We measured trait anger with seven items (“I sometimes fell like
a powder keg ready to explode”) from the translated version of
the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss and Perry, 1992; Krahé and
Möller, 2010). Response options ranged from (1) totally disagree
to (5) totally agree. We computed mean values (see below for
information on reliability and validity).
Forms and Functions of Aggression
We measured physical (“Given enough provocation, I may hit
another person,” nine items), verbal (“I can’t help getting into
arguments when people disagree with me,” five items), and
relational aggression (“When it serves my interests, I sometimes
play people off against each other,” four items), with a translated
version of the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss and Perry, 1992;
Buss and Warren, 2000; Krahé and Möller, 2010). Response
options ranged from (1) totally disagree to (5) totally agree.
We computed mean values for each scale. The Aggression
Questionnaire has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure
(e.g., Aitken Harris, 1997; Buss and Warren, 2000).
Participants rated functions of aggression with three items per
form of aggression they had reported to show, using an adapted
version of the Instrument for Reactive and Proactive Aggression
(Polman et al., 2009). Response options ranged from (1) never
to (5) very often. By averaging the function ratings across forms,
total scores for reactive (“Because you felt pressured or harassed”)
and proactive (“To demonstrate your superiority”) aggression
were calculated. We excluded 10 participants who did not report
any forms of aggression from the analyses on functions of
aggression, because participants who did not show any aggression
also cannot name any reasons for showing this behavior. Polman
et al. (2009) provided evidence for the reliability and validity of
the original measure.
Procedure
We collected the data via an online survey between September
and December 2013. All participants attended voluntarily, were
guaranteed privacy, and given the chance to win 1 out of
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10 vouchers for an online retail company. In addition to the
competition, university students received course credit for their
participation. The survey was programmed to force answers. Due
to program mistakes, however, there were isolated missing values
on single variables. Due to the low percentage of missing values
we used single imputation to replace them.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Confirmatory
Factor Analyses
Table 2 shows internal consistencies, mean values, and standard
deviations of all measures for the total sample and separately
for men and women. Gender differences were examined via
a MANCOVA controlling for age. There was a significant
multivariate main effect of gender: F(13,324)= 7.786 (p< 0.001),
η2p = 0.238. Women reported significantly higher observer
sensitivity (p = 0.028), perpetrator sensitivity (p = 0.021), and
hostile attributions (p= 0.045). Men reported significantly higher
physical (p< 0.001) and verbal (p= 0.005) aggression.
Age was negatively related to victim and rejection sensitivity
as well as proactive and relational aggression and positively
related to moral disgust sensitivity as well as hostile attributions.
Mostly in line with Hypothesis 1, we found positive correlations
between all sensitivity measures except for null-correlations of
rejection sensitivity with the justice sensitivity measures and
moral disgust as well as of victim and moral disgust sensitivity.
In line with Hypothesis 2b, victim and provocation sensitivity
were positively correlated with hostile attributions and trait
anger. Contrasting Hypothesis 2b, rejection sensitivity was only
related to trait anger. Contrasting Hypothesis 2c, observer and
perpetrator sensitivity were unrelated to hostile attributions and
trait anger. In line with Hypothesis 2d, disgust sensitivity showed
a positive correlation with hostile attributions, but no correlation
with trait anger.
Regarding aggression, provocation sensitivity, hostile
attributions, and trait anger showed the expected positive
correlations with all aggression measures. Victim and rejection
sensitivity were positively correlated with most aggression
measures, but were uncorrelated to two out of five of these
measures, respectively. Perpetrator and moral disgust sensitivity
showed the expected negative correlations with the aggression
measures with few exceptions (i.e., both were unrelated
to reactive aggression and moral disgust was unrelated to
physical aggression). Observer sensitivity was unrelated to most
aggression measures (Table 3).
To test whether the six sensitivity measures can be sufficiently
separated from another, we conducted a Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (CFA). Latent factors were indicated by test-halves,
rejection sensitivity was indicated by test-thirds (see below). An
MLM estimator accounted for non-normally distributed data.
The model with six discrete, but correlated latent sensitivity
factors showed a good fit with the data [χ2(df = 48) = 91.985,
p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.051, CFI = 0.975, SRMR = 0.030,
N = 349] and a significantly better fit than a model with a
second order factor of general interpersonal sensitivity [even
if correlations of error terms of provocation sensitivity with
victim and moral disgust sensitivity were allowed and estimated;
χ2(df = 55)= 117.677, p< 0.001, RMSEA= 0.057, CFI= 0.964,
SRMR = 0.054, N = 349; 1χ2 = 25.692, 1df = 7, 1p < 0.001].
It also fit the data better than a model with two correlated
second order factors reflecting an egoistic and altruistic/moral
focus [even if correlations of error terms of provocation
and moral disgust sensitivity were allowed and estimated;
χ2(df = 51)= 115.042, p< 0.001, RMSEA= 0.056, CFI= 0.966,
SRMR = 0.048, N = 349; 1χ2 = 23.057, 1df = 7, 1p = 0.002].
Supporting Hypothesis 1, this indicates that the sensitivities form
discrete measures rather than combining into a single factor of
general interpersonal sensitivity or into two factors with egoistic
and altruistic focus (Figure 1). Given the low factor loadings of
the rejection sensitivity measure in these models, we repeated the
TABLE 3 | Zero-order correlations of sensitivity measures, hostility, anger, aggression measures, and age in the total sample.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 JS-Victim 0.36∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.10 0.04 0.34∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.06 0.10 0.15∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.29∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗
2 JS-Observer − 0.57∗∗∗ −0.04 0.20∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 −0.01 −0.01 0.05 −0.02
3 JS-Perpetrator − 0.01 0.29∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ −0.04 −0.03 −0.11∗ −0.12∗ −0.14∗ −0.20∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.01
4 Rejection sensitivity − −0.07 0.16∗∗ 0.09 0.21∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ −0.06 0.12∗ −0.05 0.25∗∗∗ −0.13∗
5 Moral Disgust − 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.07 −0.14∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.05 0.33∗∗∗
6 Provocation
sensitivity.
− 0.24∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.02
7 Hostile attribute − 0.23∗∗∗ 0.10 0.15∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗
8 Trait Anger − 0.36∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ −0.03
9 Physical aggression − 0.29∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.05
10 Verbal aggression − 0.28∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ −0.05
11 Relational aggression − 0.31∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗
12 Reactive aggression − 0.26∗∗∗ −0.00
13 Proactive aggression − −0.20∗∗∗
14 Age −
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 1 | Comparison of three different Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) models. Results of the χ2-difference test and comparisons of absolute fit
indices indicate that model a with six discrete, but correlated sensitivity factors shows the best fit with the data. (A) CFA model with discrete, interrelated sensitivity
factors: χ2 = 91.985, df = 48, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.051, CFI = 0.975, SRMR = 0.030, N = 349. (B) CFA model with a second order factor of general
interpersonal sensitivity: χ2 = 117.677, df = 55, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.057, CFI = 0.964, SRMR = 0.054, N = 349. (C) CFA model with two second order factors
reflecting primary egoistic and altruistic/moral concerns: χ2 = 115.042, df = 51, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.057, CFI = 0.966, SRMR = 0.048, N = 349.
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analyses excluding rejection sensitivity. The pattern of results did
not change and also indicated a better fit of the model including
five correlated, but discrete sensitivity factors than the models
including second order factors. Hence, rejection sensitivity alone
did not explain for the differences between measures and also
the five other sensitivity measures should be considered discrete
measures.
Finally, a further CFA including all six distinct sensitivity
measures, hostile attributions, and trait anger and allowing
all factors to correlate, also showed a good fit with the data
[χ2(df = 89)= 132.666, p= 0.002, RMSEA= 0.037, CFI= 0.980,
SRMR = 0.031, N = 349]. This indicates that in line with
Hypothesis 2a, the sensitivity measures can be separated from
hostile attributions and trait anger as well.
Linking Sensitivity Measures, Hostile
Attributions, and Trait Anger to
Aggression
To examine the joint effects of the sensitivity measures, hostile
attributions, and trait anger on forms and functions of aggression,
we specified structural equation models using Mplus7 (Muthén
and Muthén, 1998–2012). Latent factors were indicated by test-
halves except for rejection sensitivity which was indicated by test-
thirds (initial CFAs of the rejection sensitivity measure indicated
a substantially better fit with the data if it was indicated by test-
thirds instead of test-halves). A methods factor with loadings
of all second test-halves from the justice-sensitivity subscales
accounted for variance due to similar item wordings of the
justice-sensitivity subscales (displayed as “methods factor” in
the figures). All indicators showed significant loadings on their
latent variables. We used an MLM-estimator to account for
non-normally distributed data and conducted separate analysis
for forms and functions of aggression controlling for age
and gender. A CFA including all dependent and independent
measures and with correlations between factors allowed and
estimated confirmed the intended factor structure of distinct
but interrelated factors [χ2(df = 297) = 441.942, p = 0.000,
RMSEA= 0.038, CFI= 0.961, SRMR= 0.041, N = 339].
Forms of Aggression
The path model for forms of aggression including only the
sensitivity measures explained 40.7% variance in physical, 16.8%
in relational, and 24.0% in verbal aggression (χ2 = 230.816,
df = 132, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.046, CFI = 0.962,
SRMR = 0.039, N = 349). Mostly in line with Hypothesis
3, higher observer, rejection, and provocation sensitivity and
lower perpetrator and moral disgust sensitivity predicted higher
physical aggression. Higher observer and provocation sensitivity
and lower perpetrator, rejection, and moral disgust sensitivity
predicted higher verbal aggression. Higher provocation
sensitivity and lower perpetrator and moral disgust sensitivity
predicted higher relational aggression. Victim sensitivity did not
add to the predictions (Figure 2).
When hostile attributions and trait anger were included
in the model, higher trait anger predicted all three forms
of aggression and higher hostile attributions predicted verbal
and relational aggression; some of the previously significant
effects of the sensitivity measures were non-significant (Figure 2;
χ2 = 303.183, df = 195, p< 0.001, RMSEA= 0.040, CFI= 0.966,
SRMR = 0.038, N = 349). The model added to the amount
of explained variance, explaining 47.4% variance in physical,
24.2% in relational, and 51.5% in verbal aggression. However,
the model including only the sensitivity measures and the model
also including hostile attributions and trait anger did not differ
significantly according to χ2-difference test (1χ2 = 72.367,
1df = 63, 1p = 0.196). Also absolute fit indices indicated only
small improvements of the model fit. Supporting Hypothesis 4,
this indicates that the more parsimonious model explains the data
equally well and should, therefore, be preferred.
Also when examining the moderating effect of gender, the
more parsimonious multi-group model only including the
sensitivity measures (χ2 = 422.780, df = 266, p < 0.001,
RMSEA = 0.058, CFI = 0.940, SRMR = 0.057, N = 349) was
favored over the model also including hostile attributions and
trait anger (χ2= 579.689, df = 392, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.052,
CFI = 0.942, SRMR = 0.057, N = 349; 1χ2 = 153.909,
1df = 126, 1p = 0.046; however, this model explained
much larger amounts of variance, particularly in males, that
is, 41.3% variance in physical, 42.2% in relational, and 73.7%
in verbal aggression). In the multi-group model including only
the sensitivity measures, factor loadings and intercepts were
constrained to be equal, but path weights were allowed to vary
between groups. The model revealed marked gender differences
and fitted the data significantly better than a more constrained
model with path weights constrained to be equal across groups
(χ2= 494.905, df = 308, p< 0.001, RMSEA= 0.059, CFI= 0.929,
SRMR= 0.080, N = 349;1χ2 = 72.125,1df = 42,1p= 0.003).
It explained 29.7 and 26.9% variance in physical, 16.5 and 32.0%
variance in relational, and 25.0 and 37.1% variance in verbal
aggression in females and males, respectively. Physical aggression
was predicted by higher observer and provocation sensitivity
(marginally significant results for lower victim and perpetrator
sensitivity, p = 0.057 and 0.063, respectively) in men and by
higher observer, rejection, and provocation as well as by lower
perpetrator and moral disgust sensitivity in women. Verbal
aggression was predicted by higher observer and provocation
as well as by lower perpetrator and rejection sensitivity in
men and by higher provocation as well as lower moral disgust
sensitivity in women. Relational aggression was predicted by
higher observer and provocation as well as by lower perpetrator
sensitivity in men and by lower moral disgust sensitivity in
women.
Functions of Aggression
The model for functions of aggression including only the
sensitivity measures (χ2 = 250.652, df = 143, p < 0.001,
RMSEA = 0.047, CFI = 0.958, SRMR = 0.044, N = 339)
explained 25.5% variance in proactive and 32.7% in reactive
aggression. Mostly in line with Hypothesis 3, provocation
sensitivity positively and perpetrator and moral disgust sensitivity
negatively predicted proactive aggression. Victim, rejection, and
provocation sensitivity positively predicted reactive aggression
(Figure 3).
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FIGURE 2 | Prediction of forms of aggression (total sample: controlled for gender and age; grouping model: controlled for age; correlations between
predictors allowed and estimated). Figures in front of slashes: path weights for the model only including the sensitivity measures, figures after slashes: path
weights for the model also including hostile attributions and trait anger. Figures in brackets: path weights for men and women respectively. Total sample (only
including sensitivity measures): χ2 = 230.816, df = 132, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.046, CFI = 0.962, SRMR = 0.039, N = 349; Total sample (also including hostile
attribution bias and trait anger): χ2 = 303.183, df = 195, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.040, CFI = 0.966, SRMR = 0.038, N = 349; Grouping by gender (only including
sensitivity measures): χ2 = 422.780, df = 266, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.058, CFI = 0.940, SRMR = 0.057, N = 349.
When hostile attributions an trait anger were included in the
model, higher trait anger predicted proactive and higher hostile
attributions predicted proactive and reactive aggression; some
of the previously significant effects of the sensitivity measures
were non-significant (χ2 = 310.093, df = 208, p < 0.001,
RMSEA = 0.038, CFI = 0.967, SRMR = 0.041, N = 339).
The model explained 32.6% variance in proactive and 38.7%
in reactive aggression, but it did not differ from the more
parsimonious model (1χ2 = 59.441, 1df = 65, 1p = 0.671),
indicating that the model only including the sensitivity measures
should be preferred. Supporting Hypothesis 4, absolute fit indices
indicate a somewhat, but not substantially better model fit of the
less parsimonious model as well.
Regarding the multi-group model for functions of aggression,
the χ2-difference test indicated that the more parsimonious
model only including the sensitivity measures (Figure 3;
χ2 = 429.226, df = 286, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.054,
CFI = 0.948, SRMR = 0.060, N = 339) may be preferred
over the model also including hostile attributions and trait
anger (χ2 = 558.693, df = 418, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.045,
CFI = 0.956, SRMR = 0.053, N = 339; 1χ2 = 129.467,
1df = 132,1p= 0.546; however, again, the amount of explained
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FIGURE 3 | Prediction of functions of aggression (total sample: controlled for gender and age; grouping model: controlled for age; correlations
between predictors allowed and estimated; measurement model including method factor as in Figure 1). Figures in front of slashes: path coefficients for
the model only including the sensitivity measures; figures after slashes: path weights for the model also including hostile attributions and trait anger. Figures in
brackets: path weights for men and women respectively. Total sample (only including sensitivity measures): χ2 = 250.652, df = 143, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.047,
CFI = 0.958, SRMR = 0.044, N = 339; Total sample (also including hostile attribution bias and trait anger): χ2 = 310.093, df = 208, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.038,
CFI = 0.967, SRMR = 0.041, N = 339; Grouping by gender (only including sensitivity measures): χ2 = 429.226, df = 286, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.054, CFI = 0.948,
SRMR = 0.060, N = 339.
variance of proactive aggression in men was substantially higher
if hostile attributions and trait anger were included, i.e., 76%).
The model revealed marked gender differences and showed a
significant better fit with the data than a model with path weights
constrained to be equal across groups (χ2 = 496.196, df = 323,
p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.056, CFI = 0.935, SRMR = 0.081,
N = 339; 1χ2 = 66.970, 1df = 37, 1p = 0.002). It explained
32.4 and 54.3% variance in proactive and 31.7 and 43.2% variance
in reactive aggression among women and men, respectively.
Proactive aggression was predicted by higher observer and
provocation as well as lower victim and moral disgust sensitivity
in men (marginally significant effect of lower perpetrator
sensitivity, p = 0.057) and by higher victim as well as lower
perpetrator and moral disgust sensitivity in women. Reactive
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aggression was predicted by higher rejection and provocation
as well as by lower moral disgust sensitivity in men and by
higher victim and provocation sensitivity in women (marginally
significant effect of higher rejection sensitivity, p= 0.062).
DISCUSSION
The present study examined the relations of justice, rejection,
provocation, and moral disgust sensitivity, stable personality
dispositions that capture vulnerabilities to distinct negative social
cues and show theoretical and empirical overlaps. In line with
our assumptions, however, only small to moderate positive
correlations between the sensitivity measures and results from the
CFA indicate that they cannot be integrated into a single factor
of general interpersonal sensitivity, but should be treated and
considered separately.
Because all sensitivity measures had been related to aggression
previously and because preventing aggression is an important
aim, we used aggression as an outcome measure in order to
examine the interplay of the sensitivity measures in predicting
behavior and to identify the most important potential risk
factors for aggression among these measures. Different
combinations of sensitivities predicted different forms and
functions of aggression. Hence, simultaneously considering
several sensitivities did not make any of them redundant.
However, in no case all sensitivities added to the prediction
of an aggression measure. In line with our assumptions,
provocation sensitivity showed consistent positive associations
with aggression, whereas perpetrator and moral disgust
sensitivity showed quite consistent negative associations with
aggression. Thus, these sensitivities seem to require special
focus when researching aggression and developing prevention
measures. Contrasting our expectations, observer sensitivity
showed positive relations to aggression as well, particularly in
men (cf. Bondü and Richter, 2015), whereas victim and rejection
sensitivity revealed positive and negative relations with different
aggression measures.
In line with our expectations, the sensitivity measures with
an egoistic focus were mostly positively correlated to hostile
attributions and trait anger, whereas moral disgust only related
to hostile attributions. Correlations, however, were only small
to moderate and CFA results indicated that the more specific
sensitivity measures may be separated from the two broader
trait measures. Considering hostile attributions and trait anger
substantially added to the amount of explained variance in the
aggression measures and previously significant effects of the
sensitivity measures remained significant only in approximately
one out of two cases. But χ2-difference tests and changes in
absolute fit indices indicated that hostile attributions and trait
anger did not improve the model fit significantly. Thus, they
could not better explain the effects of the sensitivity measures
on aggression. Hence, the sensitivities require consideration
by future research on aggression and seem to have important
impacts on behavior as would be postulated by the cognitive–
affective system theory of personality (Mischel and Shoda,
1995).
Differences and Similarities between the
Sensitivity Measures
As outlined above, similarities between the sensitivity measures
include a vulnerability and hypervigilance to negative social
cues, negative evaluations of others’ and one’s own behavior, and
intense negative affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses
toward these cues. Thus, in line with our expectations, we
mostly found positive correlations among the different sensitivity
measures, irrespective of their egoistic or moral/altruistic focus.
Correlations, however, were only small to moderate and CFA
results indicated them to be distinct measures as well. Thus,
despite theoretical and empirical overlaps, several differences
between measures make them sufficiently distinguishable from
one another. These differences include (Table 4):
Focus of Concern
Victim, rejection, and provocation sensitivity reflect egoistic
concerns; observer, perpetrator, and moral disgust sensitivity
reflect moral/altruistic concerns. Observers of injustice, however,
may apparently focus on egoistic or altruistic concerns and
identify with the victim or the perpetrator of injustice depending
on the situation (Lotz et al., 2011; Bondü and Krahé, 2015) as
indicated by positive and negative relations with the aggression
measures (cf. Bondü and Richter, 2015). Similarly, moral
concerns associated with moral disgust may not be altogether
altruistic, but may also subsume egoistic interests in the long-
term adherence of norms (Jones and Fitness, 2008) or the
confirmation of a positive group status as described in the
literature on altruistic punishment (e.g., Lotz et al., 2011). In
addition, although all sensitivities in the present study require
the appraisal of behavior as wrong or immoral, only perpetrator
sensitivity refers to one’s own behavior. Hence, perpetrator
sensitivity should have the strongest genuinely moral focus
among these measures.
Affective/Cognitive Focus
As outlined above, all sensitivities require a cognitive–affective
appraisal of behavior as (morally) wrong. However, only justice
and rejection sensitivity questionnaires capture both affective and
cognitive responses to unjust situations or situations that may
result in rejection. In contrast, moral disgust and provocation
sensitivity merely capture the intensity of affective responses to
morally wrong or potentially provoking behavior. Given that
moral disgust and provocation sensitivity tended to show the
most consistent and strongest (positive and negative) relations
with the aggression measures, this may indicate that the affective
component of the sensitivity measures in particular explains the
links of the sensitivity measures with the aggression measures.
Cognitive Responses
Justice sensitivity captures rumination as the central cognitive
response to injustice and also considers the strain associated
with these experiences (Baumert et al., 2014); rejection sensitivity
captures the expectation of rejection as the primary cognitive
response to rejection. Both cognitive responses may foster
social withdrawal in order to avoid future victimization. They
may, therefore, explain why all justice sensitivity subscales and
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TABLE 4 | Overview over differences and similarities between sensitivity measures.
Victim Justice
Sensitivity
Observer Justice
Sensitivity
Perpetrator Justice
Sensitivity
Rejection
Sensitivity
Provocation
Sensitivity
Moral Disgust
Sensitivity
Focus of Concern Egoistic Moral (egoistic?) Moral Egoistic Egoistic Moral (egoistic)
Affective/Cognitive Focus Affective+ cognitive Affective+ cognitive Affective + cognitive Affective + cognitive Affective Affective
Cognitive Response Rumination + strain Rumination + strain Rumination + strain Expectation of
Rejection
− −
Affective Response/Underlying Emotion Anger Indignation Guilt Anxiety (+Anger?) Anger Disgust
Time Perspective Present Present Present Future Present Present
Others’/Own Behavior Unjust/immoral Unjust/immoral Unjust/immoral Hurting Provoking Immoral
Relation Aggressive Behavior Generally positive Positive/negative Negative Positive/negative Positive Negative
rejection sensitivity also showed some negative relations with
aggression as an approach-oriented behavior and why they
were related to internalizing problems by previous research
as well (Rosenbach and Renneberg, 2011; Bondü and Elsner,
2015).
Affective Responses
The central affect underlying victim and provocation sensitivity
is anger. Indignation—the core emotion accompanying observer
sensitivity—is similar to anger, but a more complex, secondary
emotion. Perpetrator sensitivity is associated with guilt, a
secondary emotion as well (Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010;
Lawrence, 2006). In adults, the core emotion underlying
rejection sensitivity is fear, a withdrawal-oriented, primary
emotion. In children and adolescents, anxious and angry
rejection sensitivity is separately considered (Downey et al.,
1998). The correlation of rejection sensitivity and trait anger
in the present study indicates that anger may be a part of
adult rejection sensitivity as well. The null-correlation of moral
disgust sensitivity with trait anger and its negative links with
aggression indicate that the core emotion underlying moral
disgust sensitivity is indeed disgust, not anger (Pond et al.,
2011). The present results also indicate that the experience
of disgust in the face of moral norm violations is a fairly
strong emotional reaction to this kind of behavior and may,
therefore, have particularly strong influences on behavior in
terms of withdrawal.
Time Perspective
Questionnaires on justice, moral disgust, and provocation
sensitivity ask participants for typical responses in given
situations, focusing the present; the rejection sensitivity
questionnaire captures expectancies about rejection, thus
focusing the future. In doing so, the rejection sensitivity
questionnaire follows an expectancy-value conception which
strives to explain behavior by multiplying the perceived value
of an outcome with its probability of occurrence. Given that
rejection sensitivity tended to show comparably low correlations
with the other sensitivity measures and low loadings on a
general interpersonal sensitivity factor in CFA, this conception
in particular may distinguish rejection sensitivity from the
other sensitivity measures in our study conceptually as well as
statistically.
Perception of Others’ Behavior
All sensitivity measures base on the negative appraisal of
behavior, but the reasons for this judgment differ. Justice
sensitivity predisposes to perceiving behavior as unfair and
morally wrong. Disgust sensitivity predisposes to perceiving
others’ behavior as morally wrong, rejection sensitivity as hurting,
and provocation sensitivity as hostile and provoking. In line with
previous research, the perception of hostility and provocation
in others seems to promote aggressive behavior in particular
(Crick and Dodge, 1996; Lawrence and Hodgkins, 2009), whereas
perceiving others’ behavior as morally wrong and hurting even to
one’s own disadvantage may apparently result in both, aggression
and withdrawal.
Correlations with Behavior
Relations with aggression differed between sensitivity measures
(see below for details).
Based on these aspects, all sensitivity measures can be
distinguished from one another. However, similarities are
apparent, particularly between victim and provocation
sensitivity. Victim sensitivity as opposed to provocation
sensitivity, however, focuses on unjust cues in particular, does
not require injustice to occur intentionally, considers cognitive
reactions, and comprises a moral aspect as well.
Relations of the Sensitivity Measures
with Hostile Attributions and Trait Anger
Small, but significant positive correlations of victim sensitivity
with hostile attributions are in line with previous research relating
victim sensitivity to hostility (Schmitt et al., 2010). This backs the
assumption that some of its negative effects might be explained
by the tendency to attribute hostile intent to others (Gollwitzer
et al., 2013; Bondü and Krahé, 2015), presumably by intensifying
perceptions of injustice (Bondü and Richter, 2015). Correlations,
however, were only small, indicating that hostile attributions
can only account for parts of these negative effects. Positive
correlations of provocation sensitivity with hostile attributions
are not surprising, given that these attributions should be a
prerequisite to perceive others’ behavior as provoking. Our
findings, however, contradict earlier studies that did not find
differences in hostility between individuals high and low in
provocation sensitivity (Lawrence, 2006). Positive associations
of moral disgust and hostile attributions may explain previous
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findings relating general disgust to the tendency to exclude
persons who have violated moral norms (Faulkner et al., 2004).
In contrast to our expectations, rejection sensitivity did not relate
to hostile attributions. This may be due to the fact that the Adult
Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (Berenson et al., 2009) merely
captures anxious (and not angry) rejection sensitivity which does
not necessarily require attributions of negative intent.
In line with theoretical assumptions and our expectations,
victim and provocation sensitivity were positively correlated
with trait anger (Schmitt et al., 1995). Again, these results
contradict previous research that did not find differences in
trait anger between individuals high and low in provocation
sensitivity (Lawrence, 2006). In line with our assumptions, moral
disgust did not correlate with trait anger, backing research
suggesting that the core emotion underlying moral disgust
is indeed disgust, not anger (Pond et al., 2011). Although
the core emotion underlying rejection sensitivity in adults
is considered fear or concern (Downey and Feldman, 1996),
expecting rejection apparently may result in anger among
adults as well. Thus, a mixture of fear and anger may explain
the diverging relations of rejection sensitivity with different
aggression measures. Relation patterns of the sensitivity measures
with hostile attributions and trait anger were similar across
genders, but only in men, observer sensitivity showed positive
correlations with trait anger. This might explain why in
men, observer sensitivity showed positive correlations with
aggression.
Interplay of the Sensitivity Measures,
Hostile Attributions, and Trait Anger in
Predicting Aggression
When only the sensitivity measures were considered as
predictors for aggression, observer and particularly provocation
sensitivity were consistent positive and perpetrator and moral
disgust sensitivity consistent negative predictors of forms of
aggression. Thus, experiencing disgust in the face of others’
norm violations may also protect from violating social norms
oneself and to be more powerful than experiencing guilt
after behaving immorally (as in perpetrator sensitivity). Even
when controlled for hostile attributions and trait anger,
physical aggression was better predicted by observer and
provocation sensitivity that comprise aspects of anger and
the tendency to retaliate. When hostile attributions and
trait anger were controlled, victim sensitivity negatively
predicted physical and verbal aggression and negative effects
of rejection sensitivity on verbal aggression increased. This
indicates suppressor effects, most likely due to the control of
variance that anger accounts for, strengthening the impact of
moral concerns associated with victim sensitivity and of fear
associated with rejection sensitivity that should both counteract
aggression.
Regarding functions of aggression, mostly in line with
our assumptions, victim, rejection, and provocation sensitivity
positively predicted reactive aggression. Also in line with
our assumptions, negative effects of perpetrator and moral
disgust sensitivity were particularly pronounced for proactive
aggression, indicating that they protect from using aggression
in order to reach egoistic goals in particular. Interestingly, they
did not protect from reactive, that is, provoked aggression
in the present study (for contradicting results: Pond et al.,
2011; Bondü and Krahé, 2015; Bondü and Richter, 2015).
In women, victim sensitivity predicted proactive aggression
as well, indicating that victim sensitivity may not only lead
to aggression in response to previous negative cues, but
also to aggression that appears unprovoked and is used to
reach egoistic goals (cf. Bondü and Krahé, 2015; Bondü and
Richter, 2015). Hostile attributions and trait anger positively
predicted proactive aggression, particularly in men, whereas
trait anger—somewhat surprisingly and contradicting previous
research (Crane and Testa, 2014)—did not relate to reactive
aggression.
To sum up, the sensitivity measures added to the prediction
of aggression, even when controlling for more global traits
such as hostile attributions and trait anger. Moral disgust
and perpetrator sensitivity were consistent negative predictors
for forms of aggression in particular, whereas provocation
sensitivity was a consistent positive predictor, supporting the
assumption that provocation is a primary cause for aggression
(Anderson and Bushman, 2001). Thus, in line with the cognitive–
affective system theory of personality (Mischel and Shoda,
1995), the sensitivity measures apparently influence the encoding
of, interpretation of, and response to certain situations and
may account for some of the behavioral variability in given
situations.
Limitations and Outlook
The strengths of this study include the use of multiple
interpersonal sensitivities and aggression measures and the
consideration of hostile attributions and trait anger. Limitations
include the marginally acceptable internal consistencies of
rejection sensitivity and verbal aggression, differences in sample
sizes between men and women, and the lack of control for
broader personality traits such as neuroticism. Finally, our study
is cross-sectional and does not allow for causal inferences.
Future research should, therefore, replicate the present
findings with longitudinal data. It may want to consider
interaction effects of the sensitivity measures. Given the mixed
effects of rejection sensitivity on aggression and its association
with anger, future research should distinguish anxious and
angry rejection sensitivity in adults as well. Other sensitivity
measures (e.g., frustration sensitivity; Lawrence, 2006) may be
considered. Hostile attributions and trait anger are eligible
to control for negative feelings and attitudes associated with
aggression, but empathy and perspective taking may be superior
control variables for moral concerns underlying observer,
perpetrator, and moral disgust sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 2005).
Finally, future research should examine the processes explaining
gender differences in the links of the sensitivity measures and
aggression.
Despite their cross-sectional nature, the results of the present
study show that the sensitivity measures cannot be integrated to
one single factor of interpersonal sensitivity and that they add
to the prediction of aggression. This highlights the importance
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of considering contextual interpersonal differences measures in
researching aggression and in planning adequate prevention
measures. This is important, because these dispositions affect
the perception and interpretation of social cues in the long run
and, therefore, are important to address in order to prevent a
self-perpetuating circle of negative social cues and increasing
sensitivities toward these cues. Importantly, our results indicate
that these effects cannot be better explained by other well-known
risk factors for aggression and broader personality traits such as
hostile attributions or trait anger.
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